We have more sympathy with Professor Swanson's argument on the separation of cyclists and motorized traffic. It would indeed be better to change motorists' attitudes to cyclists than to allow the current attitude to persist. It might also be possible to confine at least some heavy goods vehicles to trunk roads. However, quite apart from the planning problems this proposal would present, a cycle helmet law would be far cheaper and quicker to implement.
This takes us to the ethical arguments. Swanson presents two: first, that it is unjust to impose the burden of protection on the vulnerable party rather (be that a child, or perhaps any cyclist) than on motorists; second, that it is irrational to concentrate on one risk (the risk of head injury to an unprotected cyclist) rather than any other comparable risk (for example, the risk of head injury to an unprotected motorist).
The second argument is weak. First of all, interventions to control risk should be assessed on the evidence. Our argument regarding the evidence is quite modest: we believe that the available evidence does support the proposition that cycle helmets are safe and effective in protecting cyclists from head injury. This is the essential empirical point in the ethical argument for legislation. We do not rule out other interventions to control other risks; they are not our concern here. Second, in the muddy world of public policy, consistency may be an impossible ideal. So long as policies can be justified piece by piece on their own merits, and so long as they do not lead to obvious contradictions or injustice, that is about as much as we can hope for. Arguments that we do not intervene in some other comparable cases-so why do we intervene in this case?-are arguments for never doing anything. 5 The first argument is more important. It is a defensible principle in ethics that one should not blame or punish victims for the responsible or irresponsible acts of those who have harmed them. Swanson is right to say that many, perhaps most, injuries to cyclists are caused by others. However, it is also true that we bear some responsibility for taking care of ourselves. Prevention of injury takes primacy over apportioning blame for the injury; to an injured cyclist the knowledge that someone else was responsible is of little comfort.
The case report by Mr Alaani and colleagues (April 2004 JRSM 1 ) adds to our knowledge. With reference to the last sentence-'With cautious technique, secondary instability of the cervical spine leading to neurological damage should be wholly avoidable'-may I refer to a review of earlier papers 2 and in particular to the need for cervical spine fusion in addition to osteophyte removal? The postoperative X-ray, showing a well preserved disc space at the affected level, indicates the possibility that instability may develop in this case. The osteophytes were probably providing some stability.
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